Abstract. Task-specific groups are often formed in an ad-hoc manner within big structures, like companies. Take the following typical scenario: A high rank manager decides that a task force group for some project needs to be built. This order is passed down the hierarchy where it finally reaches a manager who calls some employees to form a group. The members should communicate in a secure way and for efficiency reasons symmetric systems are the common choice. To establish joint secret keys for groups, group key exchange (GKE) protocols were developed. If the users are part of e.g. a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is usually the case within a company or a small network, it is possible to achieve authenticated GKE by modifying the protocol and particularly by including signatures. In this paper we recall a GKE due to Burmester and Desmedt which needs only O(log n) communication and computation complexity per user, rather than O(n) as in the more well-known Burmester-Desmedt protocol, and runs in a constant number of rounds. To achieve authenticated GKE one can apply compilers, however, the existing ones would need O(n) computation and communication thereby mitigating the advantages of the faster protocol. Our contribution is to extend an existing compiler so that it preserves the computation and communication complexity of the non-authenticated protocol. This is particularly important for tree based protocols.
Introduction
Today several banks have branches worldwide. Moreover, stock owners of these banks often are in different countries. In general, globalization implies that decision makers are in different locations. So efficient and secure communication within a group is very important. Clearly symmetric systems offer the higher throughput and so all group members must hold a common secret key. Given the distributed nature of the group new keys can only be established through an insecure channel. Furthermore, the parties need to be assured that this key is shared with the correct group members, so the users must be authenticated. This shows that in financial cryptography group key exchange is an important primitive.
Part of this research was done while visiting the ITSC Bochum 2004.
Another scenario is the need to set up ad-hoc groups. Organizations, such as financial ones, are usually organized in a hierarchical way. Often outside consultants are needed in virtual group meetings. The president of the organization does not know who these experts are. We find ourselves in a situation where members lower in the hierarchy decide who the outside-consultants are that should join the group. Again secure group communication is needed.
Once this symmetric key is established it can be used for basically all communication needs within the group. It not only works as the key in a symmetric system to ensure that data cannot be decrypted but also allows members within the group to communicate anonymously and the key can also be used in MACs to authenticate messages.
A simple solution for authenticated group key exchange is to have one user (the chair) choose the key and exchange it with the next one, who will exchange it with the next, etc., each by using the Diffie-Hellman KE protocol. The cost of this solution is that it requires O(n) rounds and each user has constant communication and computation. We refer to this scenario as the naive approach.
So far, several group KE protocols have been proposed, most of which are extensions of the two-party Diffie-Hellman protocol [7, 8, 15, 17, 9] . Katz and Yung [19] designed a compiler that transforms any secure group KE protocol into an authenticated KE protocol. The model used is a refinement of models proposed by Bresson et al. in [6] . The additional requirements are: a PKI for digital signatures, and each message issued should be signed and checked by all participants. 4 To avoid replay attacks and loss of intermediate messages without noticing, each group member needs to maintain a counter for messages send during one KE and a signed string must include all group participants as well as a random nonce for each participant. As an example they consider the Burmester-Desmedt scheme [7, 9] which requires a constant number of rounds but has communication complexity 5 O(n) and computational complexity of O(n). Since, apparently, there is another Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange protocol [8] , we refer to the one in [7, 9] as Burmester-Desmedt I (BD-I).
Although BD-I is considered algebraically nice, it is rarely used in real life application. As has been pointed out by many authors, e.g. [21, p.86 ] "One shortcoming of BD is the high communication overhead." It is for this reason that tree based group key exchange protocols are considered superior, as we describe further. Tree based group key exchange protocols have become quite popular due to the work of Wong-Gouda-Lam [23] (see also [24] ). They actually considered a generalization of trees, i.e., directed acyclic graphs. One should observe that many schemes can be described as trees. Indeed the Boyd and Nieto [5] scheme corresponds to a star which is a special tree. Certain trees provided better efficiency. We now discuss such a scheme.
The Burmester-Desmedt scheme II (BD-II) [8] is one of the schemes which uses a (binary) tree for group KE. Using the properties of trees, it can achieve logarithmic complexity while keeping the same constant number of rounds. (Note that the work in BD-II predates the one by Wong-Gouda-Lam.) Now if one were to use the KatzYung compiler [19] it would mitigate the advantage of BD-II as checking of O(n) signatures would be required. In this contribution we give an authenticated version of the BD-II group KE protocol with an overall communication and computation complexity of O(log n) while running in a constant number of rounds. These ideas extend to other group key exchange protocols, in particular tree based ones with logarithmic complexity. For this reason we modify the Katz-Yung compiler.
After introducing the BD-II schemes and stating the security model we give a security proof for a passive adversary of one of the Burmester-Desmedt II schemes (although the paper contains several security claims, no proofs are given in [8] ). We then extend the scheme to an authenticated KE by modifying the Katz-Yung compiler. The main problem with a direct application of the Katz-Yung compiler is that each party needs to verify O(n) signatures which turns the overall complexity to O(n) even though the underlying protocol allows for O(log n). The main observation which enables us to keep the logarithmic complexity is to notice that the joint key is computed by any user U entirely from information provided by its at most log n ancestors along the tree. Hence, only logarithmically many signatures need to be verified. We present the compiler in the most general setting applicable to any group KE protocol.
The BD-II group KE protocol is non-contributory in the sense that the key does not depend on the contribution of all members. In fact, no protocol with a computation or communication complexity lower than O(n) can be fully contributory if it runs in a constant number of rounds and without delay. However, the Katz-Yung model allows for this since it does not deal with active insiders. We show that for a passive adversary the security of the protocols has a tight reduction to the DDH problem. Active external adversaries cannot insert messages in the name of a group member as the protocol is authenticated. There is no attack advantage of being a member of system, i.e. being registered to the system's PKI, if one is not part of the group which is performing the group key exchange. When we speak of insiders we mean actual members of the group which are agreeing on a key. For the BD-I protocol it has been shown in [17, 22, 12] that as few as 2 malicious insider are enough to force the resulting group key to be any element they want, e.g. one known to an outsider, without needing any extra communication during the execution of the GKE. Our presented scheme is no more secure against active insiders. More specifically, we shall use the same model as Katz-Yung [19] which does not deal with active malicious insiders that attempt to prevent an honest party from obtaining the common group key. The advantage of an active adversary is defined to be the advantage of obtaining the common group key and like Katz and Yung we assume the "best-case" scenario of an adversary who delivers all messages intact to the appropriate recipient(s) as soon as they are sent. ( [19, Section 1.3] ). Recent work by Katz and Sun Shin [18] formalizes insider attacks and defines the security of authenticated GKE protocols against malicious insiders in the framework of universal composablility. However, [12] demonstrate that dealing with active insiders is far from trivial. They criticize the model in [18] and present a different one which they consider to be more realistic. We do not want to enter into this controversy and exclude malicious insiders. Note that a full contributory variant of BD-II is easy to design, maintaining, order-wise, the same complexity but introducing delays. A detailed description will be given in the full paper.
We recently noticed an independent result on authenticated tree based GKEs [20] . That paper is also based on the Burmester-Desmedt II GKE even though this is not stated in the paper. One shortcoming of that paper is that they require each party to check all signatures on all messages; this implies that they have O(n) computation costs rather than the desired O(log n). It is because of that difference that the Katz-Yung compiler [19] needs to be adjusted. Furthermore, their group identifiers have length O(n).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by stating the security model and surveying one of the BD-II schemes. We then prove its security against passive adversaries and provide an authenticated variant based on the DDH assumption. A comparison with other schemes shows the advantages of our proposal.
Models
Unless particularly mentioned we follow the same lines as Katz and Yung [19] who used the security model for group KE due to Bresson et al. [6] . We first introduce the notations and then briefly mention the oracles the adversary can query depending on the protocol. For full details we refer to [19] .
Participants and initialization
There is a polynomial-size set P of potential participants in the group key exchange, any subset of P may decide to establish a session key. We assume that during an initialization phase each participant in P runs an algorithm G(1 k ) to generate a pair of public and private keys (P K, SK). The secret key is stored by the user and (certified) public keys are accessible to all participants.
Adversarial model
We denote the instance i of user U as Π i U , each instance may be used only once. Each instance has associated with it the variables
and the session key sk i U which we now explain. In our model, the partner ID pid i U contains a group identifier gid which identifies all partners involved in the current execution of the GKE. The other definitions are as in [6] , so state i U represents the current (internal) state of instance Π i U , term i U acc i U and used i U take boolean values indicating whether the instance has been terminated or accepted or used, respectively. Most of these variables appear only implicitly except for pid The adversary is assumed to have full control over all communication in the network. His interaction is modeled by the following oracles: -Send(U, i, M ) -to send the message M to instance Π i U and output the reply generated by this instance. This oracle may also be used to initiate a key exchange among a group {U 1 , . . . , U n } of users identified by some group identifier gid. The length of gid must correspond to the security parameter. This means that the first round of the KE protocol is executed upon receipt of this message.
-Execute(gid) -to execute the protocol between unused instances of players U 1 , . . . , U n ∈ P determined by the group identifier gid and to output the transaction of the execution. The adversary has control over the number of players and their identities. -Reveal(U, i) -to reveal the session key sk i U of player U belonging to instance i.
-Corrupt(U ) -to output the long-term secret key SK U of player U . -Test(U, i) -to be issued the final test. Once the adversary decides that he has enough data he queries the Test oracle for a challenge. A random bit b is generated; if b = 1 then the adversary is given sk i U , otherwise he receives a random session key.
A passive adversary is given access to the Execute, Reveal, Corrupt and Test oracles, while an active adversary is additionally given access to the Send oracle. Both types of adversaries are allowed to make adaptive queries before and after the Test oracle is queried.
Partnering The session ID sid i U equals the concatenation of all messages sent and received by Π i U during the course of its execution. For the partner ID we deviate from the suggestion in [19] and generalize their setting to the situation that not each party communicates with each of the others during an execution of the protocol. Although this may seem as a slight adaptation of [19] (see also [6] ), it allows us to dramatically improve on the efficiency of the schemes.
We assume that the group of users can be identified uniquely by a group identifier gid. This assumption holds true in all network protocols and fits well for hierarchical situations we encounter in the financial world. Then pid i U consists of the group identifier and the identities of the players in the group with which Π i U interacts during the KE protocol, i.e., to which he sends messages or from which he receives messages. Since the underlying unauthenticated protocol is assumed to provide each user with the same key this implies that the union of all pid i U covers each user involved in the key exchange. Furthermore, the graph displaying the communication must be connected. This is due to the fact that all users obtain the same key. In our compiler this ensures that each signature is checked by a group member which is connected via checked paths.
Correctness We require that for all U , U and i, i involved in the same key exchange and such that acc i U = acc i U = TRUE, the same valid session key is established sk
Security and freshness An instance Π i U is fresh unless one of the following is true: (1) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(U, i) or Reveal(U , i ) for any Π i U in the same group (denoted by gid) as Π i U or (2) a query Corrupt(V ) was asked before a query of the form Send(U, i, * ) or Send(U , i , * ), where V is in pid i U . (Note that our definition of pid i U only includes those users that U is directly interacting with, i.e., those providing input to the key computation of U ).
The event Succ occurs if the attacker is successful, i.e., if he queries the Test oracle on a fresh instance Π i U for which acc i U = TRUE and guesses the bit b correctly. The advantage of attacker A against protocol P is defined as
Protocol P is a secure group KE protocol if it is secure against a passive adversary, i.e., for any PPT passive adversary A the advantage Adv A,P (k) is negligible. Protocol P is a secure authenticated group KE (AKE) if it is secure against an active adversary.
We use Adv KE P (t, q ex ) to denote the maximum advantage of any passive adversary attacking P , running in time t and making q ex calls to the Execute oracle. For the authenticated group KE we use Adv AKE−fs P (t, q ex , q s ), where q s refers to the number of Send queries.
The security of the example protocols will be based on the decisional DiffieHellman problem (DDHP), let Adv ddh G (t) be the advantage of a PPT adversary against the DDHP in a group G of order . The DDHP is the problem of distinguishing the distributions of
a, b, c ∈ R Z Z/ Z Z} given g. For a single triple this amounts to deciding whether the triple (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) ∈ G 3 is a valid Diffie-Hellman triple, i.e., if g 3 = g log g g 1 2 .
Complexity
Group KE protocols are often carried out in dynamic sets of players. One important feature of good protocols is their scalability. To take this into account we always consider the maximal complexity occurring for any user in the system. Furthermore, we consider the number of users n as the important parameter and ignore costs depending on the cryptographic primitive like the size of the underlying group g .
The communication complexity is the maximal amount of information sent and received per user. We assume that broadcasting a message does not depend on the number of receivers, however, receiving l different messages means cost of l, even if this occurs in one round. Katz and Yung [19] mention only sent messages but use it in the same way. We mention the received messages explicitly to take into account the costs for being online, and for receiving and storing messages. At the same time we also allow users to ignore communication not intended for them.
The computation complexity is the maximal amount of computation during one call of the protocol.
In both cases we are interested in the dependence on n, all other variables like group size or security parameter are considered as constant in the big-O estimates.
The Burmester-Desmedt Scheme II
We now describe in detail one scheme with logarithmic complexity. This example serves two purposes: on the one hand it gives a good example of the advantage of our compiler over that of Katz and Yung and on the other hand it closes the gap that [8] was published without security proofs.
The BD-II scheme [8] is a compiler that transforms a two-party KE protocol into a multiparty key exchange protocol. There are two variants. The first is sequential with delays. The second is a multicast version with minimal delay.
To ease exposition we focus on the Diffie-Hellman version of the BD-II scheme [8, p. 127] (one can use other two party KE protocols as primitives) and use a cyclic group G = g of prime order (although the proof remains similar if the last condition is not satisfied). The advantage of BD-II over other group KE protocols is that the communication complexity, the computation complexity and memory reduce from O(n) per party to O(log n) per party in the multicast version, and to constant in the sequential version which has O(log n) delay. The number of rounds each party is involved in (per instance) is constant and equal to three for both variants.
In this section we briefly recall the BD-II protocol [8] in the multicast version and give a proof of security of the unauthenticated scheme; a sequential version is given in the Appendix.
Let U 1 , . . . , U n be the users who want to make a group KE. We now show how their index automatically determines their place in the (almost) binary tree as in Figure 1 . This ordered tree has the property that user U i is at level log 2 (i + 1) (a rooted tree version would need one more multiplication round and is therefore avoided). The set-up can be easily done as the position of user U i corresponds to the binary expansion of i + 1, i.e., if i + 1 = (i l−1 i l−2 . . . i 1 i 0 ) 2 is the binary expansion with i j the leftmost non-zero bit then U i is on level j and his parent has expansion parent(i) + 1 = (0 . . . 0i j i j−1 i 1 ) 2 (one more leading zero). Likewise the children can easily be determined as their expressions are shifted to the right and they have the same initial binary representation with different concatenated tails. The vertices 1 and 2 consider their respective opposite as parent. So all but the leaves of the tree each have one parent and two children. To ease notation let ancestors(i) be the set of indices of all ancestors of U i , including i but having removed 1 and 2. Let parent(i), left child(i) and right child(i) be the indices of the parent of U i and its left child or right child respectively. Remark 1. One advantage of this scheme is that users only need to know users higher up in the hierarchy. This fits well to common applications of GKE in groups invoked by some manager higher up in the hierarchy who decides the members of the group and their respective function. Once the GKE protocol is started the users have already received some information publicly and their public keys are available in a public database.
While the BD-I scheme requires that each user needs to know the position of every other user relative to him, our scheme limits this to the knowledge of the positions of at most O(log n) users.
Note that all this is usually not a problem. The user name in the protocol should contain information about the user's position (the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n can be encoded with log n bits) and this number is enough to determine the relative positions for both BD-I and BD-II.
We only stress this observation since it is a often claimed as a disadvantage of BD-II that the position needs to be known even though this is true even more for BD-I.
Protocol 1 (BD-II group KE)
Let U 1 , . . . , U n be the set of all users who want to generate a common conference key. Assume that they are arranged in the binary tree as in Figure 1 . The key exchange is performed in a group g of order with generator g.
Step 1 Each U i , i = 1, . . . , n, selects k i ∈ R Z Z/ Z Z, computes and sends z i = g k i to his parent and children.
Step 2 Each U i , i = 1, . . . , n, computes and multicasts to its descendants:
Step 3 Each U i , i = 1, . . . , n, computes the conference key,
Remark 2. Honest users compute the same key,
We prove this claim by induction. First observe that
j∈ancestors(parent(i)) X j it is obvious that we have:
and z
we obtain K i = K.
Remark 3. Obviously this scheme is vulnerable to denial of service attacks. This is always an issue in group KEs and more severely in non-contributory schemes as users on lower levels or on different branches cannot notice that some members might be excluded. However, as stated before, like Katz-Yung, we only deal with attacks from outsiders.
Proof of Security against Passive Attacker for BD-II
We first show that an attacker against Protocol 1 can be used to solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem The proof is an adaption of Burmester-Desmedt's proof for BD-I in [9] .
Theorem 1. Protocol P is a secure group KE protocol. Namely
where t = t + O(|P|q ex t exp ), q ex is the number of Execute queries, and t exp is the time required to perform exponentiations in G.
Note that the time for the execution of P is made explicit by the use of t exp .
Proof. Given an algorithm A against P running in time t we show how to build a distinguisher D against the DDHP. First consider the case that A makes a single Execute query. Let D be given a triple (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) ∈ g 3 . Now D can generate a valid transcript for A as shown below. Then D runs A on this transcript and outputs 1, i.e., the claim that (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman triple, if A outputs 1 and outputs 0 otherwise.
Put z 1 = g 1 and z 2 = g 2 . Randomly choose c 3 , . . . , c n ∈ R Z Z/ Z Z and put
Consistent X i 's are obtained as X i := (z parent(i) ) c i for i ≥ 3 is easy to verify. As the c i (i ≥ 3) are distributed uniformly at random, the distribution of z i and X i is identical to that in P .
The transcript consists of T = (z 1 , . . . , z n , X 3 , . . . , X n ). Upon the Test request,
Indeed, if sk is the valid group key then g 3 = sk = z
, i.e., (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman triple. So D succeeds with the same advantage as A and needs (2n − 4)t exp additional time for the exponentiations to generate the transcript.
If more than one execution of the protocol should be allowed, one can easily generate further triples of the same type as ( )} for random exponents r j ∈ R Z Z/ Z Z.
Bounding the number n by the total number of participants |P| the claim follows.
Note that the computational complexity of computing the group key under a passive attack for an outsider corresponds to the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem, as is easy to verify (similar as in [9] ).
This protocol does not involve any longterm secrets, so Corrupt queries need not be taken into account and the protocol automatically achieves forward security.
Authenticated Group Key Exchange
A direct application of the compiler of Katz and Yung [19] would transform Protocol 1 into an authenticated KE protocol with running time and communication complexity O(n). We now provide our adjusted compiler which allows us to stay in O(log n). To simplify the presentation we assume that the reader is familiar with [19] and will only mention the differences.
To avoid replay attacks, Katz-Yung [19] introduce fresh randomness r i per user U i for each execution of the protocol, add a message number for each user, and make the signature contain information on the group of players in the AKE. We follow the same road and so we modify the protocol to always send U |j|m (the user name, the message number and the message) and not only m or U |m.
We observe that in BD-II user U i computes the X child(i) depending only on information from its parent and two children. To compute the group key sk U i = K i , user U i (i = 1, 2) uses information coming only from the same branch of the binary tree from nodes on levels above U i while U 1 and U 2 use information by their respective parents. In general, in each group KE protocol there is a clearly defined ordered set of messages used by a specific user U i and our compiler requires to check only signatures on these messages. In most tree based systems the set of users any specific user communicates with is much smaller than the total set of users; even to the extent that the number of used messages is logarithmic in the total number of users. In BD-I, however, each user processes input from every user.
We formulate the compiler in a more general setting which contains Katz-Yung's as a special case, we use the term "multicast" to stress that not all users need to receive the message. To link the messages to the structure in which the users are arranged we let the set rel U = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V t U } be the set of users whose input is processed by user U at some point in the protocol and U itself. E.g. in the BD-I protocol rel U is the whole group for any user U while in BD-II rel U is the set of all ancestors and both children of U ; it contains at most O(log n).
1. During the initialization phase, each party U ∈ P generates the verification/signing keys (P K U , SK U ) by running G(1 k ). This is in addition to any keys (P K U , SK U ) needed as part of the initialization phase of P .
2. Let U 1 , . . . , U n be the identities of users wishing to establish a joint group key and let gid be their group identifier 6 . Each user U i chooses some random nonce r i ∈ {0, 1} k and broadcasts U i |0|r i . So for each execution of the protocol fresh randomness is used and so replay is not possible. Let rel U = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V t U } be as above. Each instance Π j U stores the identities and their per-round randomness together with the group ID in direct j U = (gid|V 1 |r 1 | . . . |V t U |r t U ) and stores this as part of the state information. 3. The members of the group now execute the protocol P with the following changes: -Whenever instance Π i U is supposed to multicast U |j|m as part of protocol P , the instance computes σ = Sign SK U (j|m|direct i U ) and multicasts U |j|m|σ.
-Before using message V |j|m|σ the instance Π i U checks that (1) V ∈ pid i U 7 , (2) j is the next expected sequence number for messages from V , and, finally, (3) that Vrfy P K V (j|m|direct By sticking to the very same security definition as [19] we show that our compiler works just as well, and in particular allows having a better complexity if the underlying protocol does.
Theorem 2. If P is a secure group KE protocol achieving forward secrecy, then P given by the above compiler is a secure group AKE protocol achieving forward 6 Katz and Yung suggest to use gid = U1| . . . |Un which automatically forces them to deal with inputs of length O(n). This does not pose a problem for them because BD-I has complexity O(n) anyway. In practical situations, however, the group is formed by e. g. a manager in a bank or a network administrator at the same time as deciding membership and the number of actually used groups is on a much smaller scale than the total number of all possible groups. Quite commonly there there exists a compact description, e.g. the name of the task force. 7 Our definitions of pid and direct ensure that all players V sending necessary input are actually present together with their initial randomness.
secrecy. Namely, for q s the number of Send queries and q ex the number of Execute queries we obtain
where t = t + (|P|q ex + q s ) · t P and t P is the time required for an execution of P by any party and Succ Σ is the success probability against the used signature scheme Σ.
The compiler maintains the number of rounds and the complexity class of the protocol P .
Proof. The proof follows the same lines at the corresponding one in [19] . We use an active adversary A against P to construct an adversary against P . There are three ways in which A can succeed, namely by forging a signature if he has not queried the Corrupt oracle before, by repeating the information direct and thus reusing a signature obtained in a previous execution, or by distinguishing the key from random. It is only the latter that leads to an attack against P .
The contribution of the event Forge is as in [19] , namely
Due to the different definition of direct compared to nonces in [19] we need to reconsider the probability of Repeat. The probability that the nonce used by any user in response to an initial Send query was previously used by that user (in either another execution of Send or in an Execute query) is still bounded by
The remainder of the considerations works as in [19] . Let Ex be the event that A queries the Test oracle to an instance Π i U such that A never made a query of the form Send(U, i, * ), i.e., in the simulation A has the full transcript without patches from its own execution of P . Defining Se = Ex and considering the probabilities Pr A ,P [Succ ∧ Ex] and Pr A ,P [Succ ∧ Se] separately by constructing appropriate adversaries A 1 and A 2 one obtains the stated result. Corollary 1. The authenticated group key exchange protocol obtained from Protocol 1 by applying this compiler is secure against active attacks and has communication and computation complexity O(log n).
Remark 6. The original paper [8] describes the system in more generality allowing more than two children per vertex. For k children this means that each vertex has to compute k values for X i whereas the final computation of the key reduces to log k n computations only. While the overall number of operations is smallest for k = 2; larger k might be an interesting alternative if the storage is restricted and only log k n elements can be stored from the multicast to compute K. In the sequential version (see Appendix) a larger k reduces the delay while making each step more expensive. Again the maximal overall efficiency is obtained for k = 2.
In an authenticated version, however, at most k + log k n signatures need to be verified and k + 1 messages must be signed. Additionally k + 2 exponentiations are needed. In the ElGamal signature scheme, two exponentiations are needed per signature generation and a multi-exponentiation is used for verification. Accordingly a larger k reduces the computational complexity.
Comparison
To show the advantages of our group AKE we give an overview of the costs for the naive version (one party transmits the key to the next participant, etc.), the BD-I version considered in [19] and the two authenticated BD-II versions proposed in this paper, in the table below -see Table 6 .
We also take into account the scheme by Boyd and Nieto [5] and the scheme by Bresson et al. [6] . In the Boyd-Nieto scheme one user U 1 chooses the key and encrypts this key for all n − 1 other group members. This long message is signed and broadcast to all participants who then check the signature and decrypt their part to obtain the joint key. If a public key system is used for the encryption this scheme runs in 1 round. Otherwise a further round is necessary in which each party U i (including U 1 ) sends g k i . Then the Diffie-Hellman key g k 1 k i is used to transmit the group key. This scheme requires the party U 1 to perform O(n) computations and the message has length O(n). We denote the first version by BN PK and the second one by BN DH.
In [6] the authors use g k 1 k 2 k 3 ...kn as the joint secret key. To make this possible, the users sequentially add their contribution k i to the key which accounts for requiring n rounds and the last user needs to send g (k 1 k 2 k 3 ...kn)/k i to user U i for each i, so he has communication and computation O(n).
Except for [5] and [6] group KE schemes are balanced in workload in the sense that all users have about the same amount of work. The table below states the maximal values per user. Katz and Yung use the same measures because maximal effort per user captures scalability.
To describe the message and communication complexity, we use p to denote point-to-point communication and b to denote broadcast. As the set of users is finite we do not distinguish between multicast and broadcast, otherwise the BD-II protocols use only multicast while BD-I needs broadcast. Furthermore, we list the maximal length of the messages.
For the computation S means signatures, V means verifying, E stands for full exponentiation and M for multiplication. For Boyd-Nieto PK we assume ElGamal encryption; the costs for retrieving the public keys are not mentioned. We neglect the number of inversions as there are at most 2 of them. For the number of rounds we consider the maximal delay of the protocol. Except for the second version of BD-II and [6] this is the maximum number of rounds per user. In the last protocol there are 3 rounds per user. Accordingly, our authenticated BD-II version achieves an overall complexity of O(log n) while Katz-Yung [19] based on BD I need O(n) in communication and in computation. Additionally, the number of messages to be stored from the broadcast is O(log n), as only the messages of the maximal log n ancestors are needed. The sequential version has a delay of log n but reduces the requirements considerably, e.g.,, no broadcast is assumed and far fewer operations. This might be interesting in restricted networks which need to minimize the computational and technical requirements trading it off for a longer overall execution of the protocol.
